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Abstract
We develop a knowledge-based growth model to address the issues of
directed technological change, wage inequality and economic growth, in
which skilled workers are used both in innovation and production. Since
skill-biased technological change may lead to a decrease in the average
productivity in R&D sectors, scale e⁄ect is removed. Free trade between
developed countries increases the demand for skilled workers employed
in the production of the skill-intensive good, thus promoting skill-biased
technological change through the market size e⁄ect and an increase in
skill premia. In contrast, free trade between developed and developing
countries reduces the pro￿ts of skill-complementary innovation, since its
market is relatively small in the developing country. Thus, international
trade may lead to skill-replacing technological change and decrease wage
inequality in the developed country. Wage inequality, however, increases
in the developing countries since the degree of skill bias of technology in
the developing country in the open economy is greater than the one in
autarky. Skill-biased technological change has opposite e⁄ects on eco-
nomic growth, therefore trade stimulates economic growth in some cir-
cumstances, and hurts it in other circumstances.
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11 Motivation
Many knowledge-based growth models imply that there exists scale e⁄ect, that is,
the growth rate rises with total population or the employment of scientists and
engineers. The data, however, is against this theoretical implication. For example,
￿gure 1 in Jones (1995a) reports that, despite a substantial increase in the amount
of labor engaged in R&D, there has not been any upward trend in many OECD
countries for the postwar period. Moreover, ￿gures 2 and 3 in Laincz and Peretto
(2006) show that the productivity growth rate remains roughly unchanged, even
though the total personnel and R&D personnel raise in the United States. In the
meantime, since the relative supply of skilled workers goes up sharply after World
War II1, technological change is towards skills. Acemoglu (2002b) states that,
assuming the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers to be
1.4, the degree of skill bias of technology was approximately 0.030 in 1960, became
0.069 and 0.157 in 1970 and 1980, respectively, increased to 0.470 in 1990.
Acemoglu (2009, Ch. 15) tries to build a knowledge-based model of directed
technological change to remove scale e⁄ect. However, Acemoglu￿ s model assumes
that the total amount of scientists employed in R&D sectors is given exogenously.
Indeed, how many scientists are employed must be an equilibrium allocation of
skilled workers between production and innovation. In other words, Acemoglu￿ s
model is not a real knowledge-based one in the sense that skilled workers are not
allocated between production and innovation. Moreover, one implication of Ace-
moglu￿ s model is that the economic growth rate depends on the growth rate of the
population of scientists. Finally, the relationship between skill-biased technologi-
cal change and scale e⁄ect is ignored in Acemoglu￿ s model. Hence, the ￿rst goal
of this paper is to develop a model to account for the above two facts, accelerated
skill-biased technological change and the absence of scale e⁄ect.
The existing models of directed technological change mainly focus on the e⁄ect
of trade between developed and developing countries on skill premia (for example,
Acemoglu, 2003a, 2009, Theonig and Verdier, 2003). They disregard the e⁄ect of
trade between developed countries (regions) on skill premia. As a matter of fact,
numerous studies document that trade in intermediate goods between developed
countries or regions has grown substantially in the last decades (e.g., Krugman,
1995, 2000, Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, Feenstra, 1998). Furthermore, to a great
extent, they also neglect the impact of trade on economic growth. In Acemoglu
(2003a) free trade will not change the growth rate of developed countries. There-
fore, the second goal of this paper is to investigate the e⁄ect of trade on world
growth and skill premia.
1Autor et al (1998) have reported that on average the supply of skills has grown 3.06 percent a year during
1970 and 1995, while it has raised 2.63 percent a year between 1940 and 1970.
2The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we review the related
literature. Section 3 presents the basic model, building on Rivera-Batiz and Romer
(1991) and Acemoglu (1998, 2002a, 2003a, 2007, 2009). The key assumption is
that knowledge and skilled workers are the only inputs for innovation. In Section
4, we apply the basic model to address the issues of the direction of technological
change, scale e⁄ect and skill premia. Section 5 extends the basic model to illustrate
the impact of international trade on wage inequality and economic growth. Some
conclusions are contained in Section 6.
2 Related Literature
In the last decade there was a ￿ ourishing controversy about scale e⁄ect. Does a
large economy grow faster? The answer from the ￿rst-generation knowledge-based
growth models is yes (Romer, 1990, Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Aghion and
Howitt, 1992). But the empirical analysis has questioned the validity of scale e⁄ect.
As a result, the second-generation models have been proposed to remove scale
e⁄ect. These models exhibit semi-endogenous growth, i.e., technological change is
endogenous in the sense that it requires real resources, as do the ￿rst-generation
models, but the long-run growth is exogenous and proportional to the rate of
population growth as in the neo-classical growth models (Jones, 1995a, 1995b,
Kortum, 1997, Segerstrom, 1998, Acemoglu, 2009). The result that exponential
growth depends on population growth is su¢ ciently at odds with the spirit of
the endogenous growth literature, hence the third-generation models have been
put forward to eliminate scale e⁄ect while the endogeneity of the steady state
growth rate is preserved (Young, 1998, Peretto, 1998, Aghion and Howitt, 1998,
Dinopoulos and Thompson, 1998).2
Many of the existing models have not considered the direction of technological
change, and Acemoglu (1998, 2001, 2002a, 2003a, 2009) has made a serious e⁄ort
to study whether or not technological change is biased towards particular factors.
This paper explores the relationship between skill-biased technological change and
scale e⁄ect. First, skill-biased technological change has a negative e⁄ect on the
growth rate by reducing the average productivity of skill-complementaryknowledge
in the R&D sector, which creates innovation complementing skilled workers. Sec-
ond, it has a positive e⁄ect on the growth rate by raising the average productivity
of labor-complementary knowledge in the R&D sector, which generates knowledge
complementing unskilled workers. Therefore, when the amount of skilled workers
increases, the growth rate remains unchanged if the two competing e⁄ects exactly
o⁄set each other, and the growth rate decreases if the former e⁄ect is powerful.
2See Jones (1999, 2005) for further theoretical and empirical references.
3To our knowledge, this paper is the ￿rst to explain these two phenomena, acceler-
ated skill-biased technological change and the absence of scale e⁄ect in a uni￿ed
framework.
This paper shows that increased international trade between developed coun-
tries could be a major cause of rising wage inequality because it induces skill-biased
technological change.3 Acemoglu (2003a) and Theonig and Verdier (2003), among
others, show that international trade between a developed and developing coun-
try increases wage inequality by leading to technological change towards skilled
workers. In Acemoglu￿ s paper, it is trade in the ￿nal good that leads to the rela-
tive price of the skill-intensive good go up, thus encouraging technological change
towards skilled workers and increasing skill premia. Thoenig and Verdier (2003)
show that free trade causes knowledge di⁄usion and extends the possibilities of
imitation, hence inducing ￿rms to adopt defensive innovation strategies to rein-
force non-replication measures. This strategy leads to an increment in the relative
demand for skills, thus raising skill premia. Unlike in the existing papers, the main
mechanism in this paper is that international trade between developed countries
increases the amount of skilled workers used in the production of the skill-intensive
good, hence resulting a large market size for skill-complementary technology. As a
consequence, international trade encourages skill-biased technological change and
an increase in wage inequality.
Furthermore, our paper shows that since the market of skill-complementary
technology in the developing country is relatively small, trade opening reduces
the relative pro￿ts of skill-complementary technology. Consequently, technologi-
cal change may be skill-replacing and wage inequality in the developed country
declines. This result is di⁄erent from the one in Acemoglu (2003a) and Theonig
and Verdier (2003). Moreover, the degree of skill bias of technology in the open
economy is greater than that in the developing country before opening, since the
developed country is skill-abundant. Therefore, open trade leads to an increase in
wage inequality in the developing country.
Since open trade between developed countries encourages technological change
towards skilled workers, it promotes economic growth when the positive e⁄ect of
skill-biased technological change on the growth rate is powerful. Yet open trade
hurts economic growth when the negative e⁄ect of skill-biased technological change
on the growth rate is dominant. Similarly, open trade between developed and de-
3A number of empirical studies have reported a substantial increase in skill premia, while the supply of skills
was rising rapidly in most developed countries during last decades. In response to these studies, the theoretical
literature has stressed two main explanations: increased international trade and skill-biased technological change
(see Aghion, Carloli and Garc￿-Peæalosa, 1999, Acemoglu, 2002b, Hornstein, Krusell and Violante, 2005). Most
economists argue it is likely that skill-biased technological change plays a more important role than international
trade. In other words, they state that if the introduction of new technology increases the demand for skilled
workers, then wage inequality will likely increase during the period of economic development (Katz and Murphy,
1992, Krusell, Rios-Rull and Violante, 2000, Acemoglu, 1998, 2002a, 2003a).
4veloping country would also not increase the world growth rate. This implies that
trade opening does not always stimulate economic growth, even though it enhances
the opportunities of (developing) countries to access advanced technology. This re-
sult is di⁄erent from the one in the existing studies (e.g., Rivera-Batiz and Romer,
1991), which shows that trade with ￿ ows of ideas can permanently increase the
rate of growth.
There are three forces determining the direction of technological change: (1)
the price e⁄ect, which creates incentives to develop unskill-biased (skill-replacing)
technology when the amount of skilled workers is big; (2) the market size e⁄ect,
which induces the development of skill-biased technology when the quantity of
skilled workers is large; and (3) the e⁄ect of innovation possibilities frontier, which
encourages the development of future skill-complementary (labor-complementary)
technology when technological change today is biased towards labor (skills). The
elasticity of substitution between the factors, skilled and unskilled workers, de-
termines the relative strengths of the former two competing e⁄ects. The bigger
the elasticity of substitution, the more powerful the market size e⁄ect. At the
same time, the e⁄ect of innovation possibilities frontier increases with the degree
of state-dependence.4
We show that when the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled
workers is su¢ ciently large and the degree of state-dependence is small enough,
technological change is skill-biased. In the meantime, since an increase in the
amount of skilled workers increases the relative wages of unskilled workers by rais-
ing the relative price of the labor-intensive good, skill-biased technological change
does not favor skilled workers absolutely. Skill premia increase only if the elasticity
of substitution is su¢ ciently great. These results of the direction of technological
change and skill premia look similar to those in Acemoglu (2002a). However, our
framework is di⁄erent from that in Acemoglu￿ s. In our model, the knowledge ac-
cumulation equation is a knowledge-based speci￿cation, in which skilled workers
and knowledge are the only inputs generating new innovation. Acemoglu￿ s model,
on the other hand, uses a lab-equipment speci￿cation, in which only the ￿nal good
is used in generating new knowledge.5
3 The Model
In this section, we outline the basic model. The key assumption is that skilled
workers are used both in innovation and in consumer goods production.
4The degree of state-dependence measures the spillover e⁄ect of one type of technology on the production of
another one. See Acemoglu (2002a) for the de￿nition.
5See River-Batiz and Romer (1991) for the discussion of the two speci￿cations.
53.1 The Environment
We consider a close economy populated H skilled workers and L unskilled workers.
Representative consumers have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences.







where C(t) is consumption at time t, ￿ is the coe¢ cient of the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution, and ￿ is the discount rate. We suppress time index for
simplicity.
Maximization of utility, subject to a standard budget constraint, yields the







(r ￿ ￿); (2)
where r is the rental price of capital. Equation (2) says that the larger the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution, the higher the rate of consumption growth;
and that the greater the discount rate, the lower the rate of consumption growth.
Aggregate output is de￿ned over a constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
aggregate of a skill-intensive and a labor-intensive good. More formally, aggregate











where Yl is the total output of the labor-intensive good, Yh is the total output of
the skill-intensive good, and parameter ￿ 2 [0;1) is the elasticity of substitution
between the two goods. When ￿ = 1, the two goods are perfect substitutes, and
the function is linear. When ￿ = 1, the function is Cobb-Douglas. And when ￿ = 0,
there is no substitution between the two goods, and the production function is
Leontie⁄.
The market for the two goods is competitive, hence market clearing implies











where ph and pl are the prices of the skill-intensive and the labor-intensive good,
respectively. We choose the price of the ￿nal good as the numeraire.
The skill-intensive good is produced by skilled workers and di⁄erent types of
intermediate goods, whereas the labor-intensive good is produced by unskilled
6workers and a set of di⁄erentiated intermediates. For simplicity, suppose some
intermediate goods are skill-complementary, while other intermediate goods are
labor-complementary. Speci￿cally, the production functions of the skill-intensive












1￿￿ di ￿ L￿; (6)
where 0 < ￿ < 1, Az is the varieties of intermediate goods complementary to work-
ers of skill level z, kz (i) is the quantity used of intermediate good i together with
workers of skill level z, z = h;l. Indexes h and l denote skilled and unskilled workers,
respectively. HY is the amount of skilled workers employed in the production of the
skill-intensive good, L is the amount of unskilled workers used in the production
of the labor-intensive good. The assumption that di⁄erent intermediate goods are
employed to produce di⁄erent goods allows technological change to be biased. The
production functions in (5) and (6) exhibit constant returns to scale in inputs: a
double of labor and the quantities of all intermediate goods doubles output. How-
ever, the production possibilities set of the economy will exhibit increasing returns
to scale because technological knowledge, Az, will be determined endogenously.
The innovation possibilities frontier takes the form of knowledge-based R&D
speci￿cation. Formally, the production functions for the variety of new machines













where Hz is the quantity of skilled workers employed in generating knowledge com-
plementary to workers of skill level z.6 Equation (7) says that R&D activity is more
skill-intensive than consumer goods production. As Acemoglu (2002a), ￿ ￿ 1 mea-
sures the degree of state-dependence. When ￿ = 0, there is no state-dependence,
because both Ah and Al create spillovers for research in both sectors. In contrast,
when ￿ = 1, there is an extremely large amount of state-dependence, since Ah and Al
only cause spillovers for skill-complementary and labor-complementary innovation,
respectively. The main di⁄erence between our model and Acemoglu￿ s is whether
R&D sectors use skilled workers or not.
6The existing studies give attention to the relationship between the number of scientists and economic growth.
Therefore, we assume that, in this paper, R&D sectors only employ skilled workers. Of course, we can alternatively
assume that R&D sectors employ unskilled workers or a combination of skilled and unskilled workers. Due to
space limits, we leave out the discussion.
73.2 Equilibrium
We now characterize the economic equilibrium in this economy. As a price taker,
producers of the skill-intensive and the labor-intensive good maximize pro￿ts by
taking the prices of the two goods, wages, and the rental prices of intermediate
goods as given. This maximization results in the demand for intermediate good i
complementary to skilled and unskilled workers:
kh (i) = [(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ph=￿h (i)]
1=￿ ￿ HY ; (8)
and
kl (i) = [(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ pl=￿l (i)]
1=￿ ￿ L; (9)
where ￿z (i) is the price of intermediate goods. For convenience and without loss of
generality, suppose the marginal cost for the production of any intermediate good
is ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)
2 units of the ￿nal good. Producers of intermediate good i choose a
level of output kz (i) to maximize pro￿ts
￿z (i) = max
kz(i)
￿z (i)kz (i) ￿ ￿kz (i): (10)
The revenue is ￿z (i) times kz (i), and the total cost is ￿kz (i) units of the ￿nal good.
The maximization of pro￿ts gives the monopoly price:
￿z (i) = ￿z = 1 ￿ ￿; (11)
which is the same at all points in time and for all types of intermediates. Therefore,
substitution of (11) into (8) and (9) yields the demand for intermediate good i used
by workers of skill level h and l:
kh = kh (i) = (ph)
1=￿ ￿ HY ; (12)
and
kl = kl (i) = (pl)
1=￿ ￿ L: (13)
Therefore, the monopoly pro￿ts of any intermediate good used by skilled and
unskilled workers at time ￿ are respectively
￿h (￿) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[ph (￿)]
1=￿ ￿ HY ; (14)
and
8￿l (￿) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[pl (￿)]
1=￿ ￿ L: (15)
Substituting (12) and (13) into (5) and (6), respectively, we obtain
Yh = (ph)
(1￿￿)=￿ ￿ AhHY and Yl=(pl)
(1￿￿)=￿ ￿ AlL: (16)
Inspection of (4) and (16) reveals that the relative price of the skill-intensive and














This shows that when either the technology is highly skill-biased (high Ah=Al) or
the relative amount of skilled workers employed in the production of the skill-
intensive good is large (high HY =L), the relative supply of the skill-intensive good
is large and the relative price is low.
If there is free entry into the R&D business and if the equilibrium quantity of
skilled workers employed in R&D sectors is nonzero at all points in time, then
the price for knowledge will be bid up until it is equal to the present value of the







where Pz(t) is the price for knowledge. If Pz(t) is constant (as it will be in the
equilibrium characterized below), the condition can be rewritten as a more intuitive
form. Di⁄erentiating with respect to time t results in





t r(s)ds￿z (￿)d￿: (19)





This equation says that the interest rate, r(t), is the ratio of the monopoly pro￿ts
￿ ow, ￿z (t), to the lump-sum cost on the initial investment in discovering a new
design for a type of intermediate good. Equations (14), (15) and (20) suggest that
the prices of skill- and labor- complementary knowledge are respectively
Ph = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(ph)
1=￿ ￿ HY =r and Pl = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(pl)
1=￿ ￿ L=r: (21)
The wages paid in the skill-intensive good sector are
9wh = ￿(ph)
1=￿ ￿ Ah: (22)
In the meantime, inspection of (7) and (21) yields the wages paid in R&D sectors:









Skilled workers are employed to produce the skill-intensive good and knowledge,
thus the equilibrium wages paid in the skill-intensive good sector and R&D sectors







This shows that labor and capital is substituted, if the rental price of capital rises,
then the ￿rm employs more labor and less capital, and vice versa. Since Ah=Al
determines the relative productivity of skilled and unskilled workers, producers of
the skill-intensive good increase the demand for skilled workers as Ah=Al increases.
In the balanced growth path (BGP), the number of skill-complementary inter-
mediate goods and that of labor-complementary intermediate goods have the same
growth rate. Therefore, (7) suggests
(Ah=Al)
￿￿1 Hh = Hl: (25)
Meanwhile, output, consumption and the number of intermediate goods grow at














Obviously, (26) is the result of skilled wage equalization in production and innova-
tion which also takes into account the steady-state growth rate determined by the
allocation of skilled workers to production and innovation. In order to obtain the
equilibrium growth rate, it is useful to know the value of Ah=Al. For this purpose,












￿(￿￿1) . Clearly, (27) comes from equalization of skilled wages in
the innovation of skill- and labor- complementary knowledge which also takes into

































The existence of a solution to (28) is easily proven (see the Appendix). Apparently,











I, I ￿ 1, denote











j as i > j.
If the dynamic path of this economy can be described precisely, we can show
which solution maximizes the utility. Unfortunately, the dynamics are so compli-
cated that it is impossible to do this. In most cases, an increase in the growth
rate increases social welfare.8 Therefore, it is reasonable to let the degree of skill
bias of technology maximizing the growth rate be a unique equilibrium.9 Hence,













































2 . The growth rate expression suggests that the parameters must be assumed
to be such that g￿ ￿ 0. Otherwise, the constraint that Az cannot be decreasing
would be violated, and the free-entry condition for R&D would not hold with
equality.
We now investigate the stability of the equilibrium. Combining (17), (21)

















￿ < 0 when ￿ < 1
1+￿(￿￿1).
Therefore, when ￿ < 1
1+￿(￿￿1), equilibrium dynamics are stable. On the contrary,
when ￿ > 1
1+￿(￿￿1), the equilibrium is unstable and will take us to a corner solution
where only one type of R&D is undertaken. Thus, in the following analysis, we
restrict our attention to the case where ￿ < 1
1+￿(￿￿1) is satis￿ed.
Furthermore, by (3), (16) and (17), we know that the elasticity of substitution
between the two factors, skilled and unskilled workers, is 1+￿(￿ ￿ 1). The elasticity
of substitution is generally di¢ cult to estimate, but there is a relatively widespread
consensus that it is greater than 1, most likely, greater than 1.4, and perhaps as
large as 2.10 Hence, we take ￿> 1 in the rest of the paper.
7Obviously, under some circumstances (e.g., when ￿ = 1), (28) has only a single solution. See the Appendix
for further details.
8High growth rate does not increase social welfare when economic growth causes large negative external e⁄ects.
9Indeed, the main results are independent of which degree of skill bias of technology is used in the following
analysis.
10See Acemoglu (2002b) for further references.
114 Applications
In this section, we apply the model to address the issues of directed technological
change, scale e⁄ect and wage inequality.
4.1 Directed Technological Change
Using (21), we obtain the relative pro￿tability of innovating technology comple-













This expression shows that the relative pro￿tability of the two types of innova-
tion is determined by the price e⁄ect and the market size e⁄ect. Clearly, the
more the amount of skilled workers used in the production of the skill-intensive
good, the lower the relative price of the good. Therefore, other things being
equal, the relative pro￿tability of the two types of innovation declines with the
quantity of skilled workers used in the production of the skill-intensive good via
the price e⁄ect. Equations (8) and (9) imply that the relative demand for skill-
complementary intermediates increases with the amount of skilled workers. It is
followed that the more the quantity of skilled workers, the larger the relative pro￿ts
of skill-complementary intermediates. Hence, other things being equal, the rela-
tive pro￿tability of the two types of innovation rises with the quantity of skilled
workers used in the production of the skill-intensive good via the market e⁄ect.












This says that the e⁄ect of innovation possibilities frontier reduces the relative
pro￿ts of future technology complementing skilled or unskilled workers, when tech-
nological change today is skill-biased or unskill-biased. Equation (7) shows that
skill-biased technological change declines the average productivity of Ah in the
R&D sector which generates knowledge complementary to skilled workers, while
12it increases the average productivity of Al in the R&D sector which generates
knowledge complementary to unskilled workers. Therefore, the relative pro￿ts of
future skill-complementary technology decreases when technological change today
is biased towards skills.
The greater the pro￿tability of innovation, the more the innovation. Therefore,
(30) and (31) reveal that the direction of technological change depends on three
strengths: the price e⁄ect, the market size e⁄ect and the e⁄ect of innovation
possibilities frontier.
We now address the issue of directed technological change. If the relationship
between HY and H is known, then by using (27), we can easily address the issue




i.e., the more the relative amount of skilled workers, the more the relative quantity
of skilled workers employed in the skill-intensive good sector. Therefore, combining
(27) and (32), we state the following proposition.
Proposition 1 When ￿ > 1 and ￿ < 1
1+￿(￿￿1), technological change is skill-biased.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition is straightforward. The greater the pro￿tability of innovation, the
more the innovation. Therefore, (30) and (31) reveal that the direction of techno-
logical change depends on three strengths: the price e⁄ect, the market size e⁄ect
and the e⁄ect of innovation possibilities frontier. An increase in the amount of
skilled workers enlarges HY
L , thus encouraging technological change towards skilled
workers. In contrast, it induces skill-replacing technological change by decreasing
the relative price of the skill-intensive good, p. Clearly, when ￿ > 1 and ￿ < 1
1+￿(￿￿1),
the market size e⁄ect is relatively powerful, the price e⁄ect and the e⁄ect of inno-
vation possibilities frontier are su¢ ciently weak. As a result, technological change
is towards skilled workers. Thus, like Acemoglu (2002a), our knowledge-based
model can provide a possible interpretation for why technological change over the
past 60 years was skill-biased, for why the skill bias may have accelerated over
the past twenty-￿ve years and for why new technology introduced during the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was unskill-biased.
4.2 Scale E⁄ect
The ￿rst-generation knowledge-based growth models suggest that a large economy
grows fast (Romer, 1990, Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Aghion and Howitt, 1992).
11See proof in the Appendix.
13However, a large number of empirical studies have shown that scale e⁄ect is absent
in the postwar period￿ i.e., the growth rate exhibits no large persistent change,
while the amount of skilled workers employed in R&D sectors increases largely.
Therefore, a lot of models have been developed to remove scale e⁄ect on the
growth rate (see, for example, Jones, 1995, Kortum, 1997, Young, 1998, Peretto,
1998, Aghion and Howitt, 1998, Peretto and Smulders, 2002, Acemoglu, 2009). In
these papers, one mechanism behind the story of the absence of scale e⁄ect is the
decreasing returns to knowledge, whereas another mechanism is that the entry of
new ￿rms perfectly dilutes the larger rent for innovation originating from a larger
market. We would like to provide a new insight here as to why scale e⁄ect might
be removed.
Using (29), we state the following proposition
Proposition 2 Suppose ￿ > 1 and ￿ < 1
1+￿(￿￿1). When ￿ = 1￿￿
2 , the growth rate is
unrelated to the amount of skilled workers, i.e.,
@g
￿
@H = 0. While ￿ < 1￿￿
2 , the growth




Proof. See the Appendix.
Let us recall (7). On the one hand, skill-biased technological change decreases
the average productivity of Ah in the R&D sector, which generates knowledge com-
plementary to skilled workers, hence the growth rate declines. On the other hand,
it increases the average productivity of Al in the R&D sector, which creates knowl-
edge complementing unskilled workers. Thus the growth rate raises.13 Therefore,
when the quantity of skilled workers goes up, the growth rate remains unchanged
if the two competing forces exactly o⁄set each other, and the growth rate decreases
if the former force is powerful.14
It is argued here that, since skill-biased technological change decreases the av-
erage productivity in R&D sectors, the growth rate remains invariant or declines
in the postwar period in the United States, even though the number of scientists
grows. Hence, the mechanism behind the story of the absence of scale e⁄ect in
this paper is di⁄erent from that in the existing literature.
Indeed, even though the increase in the amount of unskilled workers is taken
12Since empirical studies document that the increase in the amount of scientists does not lead to high economic
growth, we only focus on the e⁄ect of the amount of skilled workers on the growth rate.
13Unskill-biased technological change increases the average productivity of Ah in the R&D sector, which
produces skill-complementary knowledge, and decreases the average productivity of Ah in the R&D sector, which
generates labor-complementary knowledge. Therefore, a large economy also may not grow fast when technological
change is unskill-biased.
14Grossman and Helpman (1991) discuss the relationship between the size of the economy and the growth rate.
They show that an expansion in the factor used most intensively in the R&D sector necessarily speeds innovation
and growth, but an expansion of the factor used least intensively in this activity slows down growth. Therefore,
an increases in the stock of human capital increases the growth rate, whereas the growth rate decreases with the
increases in the amount of unskilled labor.
14into account, the main quantitative result may still stay.15 For example, according
to Acemoglu (2002b), the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled
workers is assumed to be 1.4, the degree of skill bias of technology was approxi-
mately 0.069 in 1970, and increased to 0.470 in 1990. In this circumstance, suppose
that 2￿+￿￿1
2 = ￿ 2
11, and that the amount of unskilled workers has increased 20%
during 1970 and 1990, then (28) suggests that the growth rate in 1970 roughly
equals to the one in 1990.
4.3 Skill Premia
Inspection of (16) yields the ratio of the wages paid for skilled workers to the ones












It suggests that skill premia are greater when either the relative price of the skill-
intensive good is higher or the technology is more skill-biased. Combining (17),












￿(￿￿1) might be positive or negative when ￿ > 1. Therefore, inspect-
ing proposition 1 and (34), we state the following proposition
Proposition 3 When ￿ > 1 and 1 ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ 1) < ￿ < 1
1+￿(￿￿1), skill premia increase with
the amount of skilled workers; when ￿ > 1 and ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ 1), skill premia are
unrelated to the amount of skilled workers; when ￿ > 1 and ￿ < 1 ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ 1), skill
premia decrease with the amount of skilled workers.
Proof. See the Appendix.
An increase in the quantity of skilled workers will decrease skill premia through
declining the relative price of the skill-intensive good. Obviously, the e⁄ect is
determined by the elasticity of substitution between the skill-intensive and the
labor-intensive good. Thus, skill premia rise with the amount of skilled workers if
the e⁄ect is su¢ ciently weak, i.e., ￿ is great such that 1￿￿(￿ ￿ 1) < ￿ < 1
1+￿(￿￿1) can
be satis￿ed. Whereas, skill premia decrease if the e⁄ect is strong enough, that is,
￿ is small such that ￿ < 1 ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ 1) holds.
Since 1 < 1+￿(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ 2, 0 < 1￿￿(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ 1. Therefore, it is remarkably possible
that 1 ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ 1) < ￿ < 1
1+￿(￿￿1), ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ 1) or ￿ < 1 ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ 1) hold. Thus,
15If the amount of unskilled workers also increases, then the growth rate decreases with the amount of skilled






15proposition 3 implies that under some circumstances, even though technological
change is skill-biased, skill premia may remain unchanged or decrease.
5 International Trade, Growth and Wage Inequality
This section investigates the impact of trade in consumer and intermediate goods
on wage inequality and economic growth. We ￿rst focus on the case of trade
between two identical developed countries, then consider the general case of trade
between developed and developing countries. In both cases, knowledge ￿ ow with
trade in intermediates is permitted.
5.1 Trade between Identical Countries
Because of symmetry, for simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume
that the two countries develop di⁄erent sets of intermediate goods in autarky.
Therefore, at all points in time, there will be balanced trade. Producers of the
skill-intensive good at home maximize pro￿ts, taking the price of the skill-intensive
good, the prices of intermediate goods produced at home and abroad, and wages

































db i ￿ whHY ; (35)
where intermediates produced at home and abroad are denoted by i and b i, respec-
tively. It follows from (35) that the quantities of domestic and imported interme-
diates are, respectively,
kh (i) = [(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ph=￿h (i)]










￿ HY : (36)
Equation (36) suggests that the monopoly prices of domestic and imported inter-
mediates complementing to skills are given as 1 ￿ ￿. It implies that intermediates
will only be exported if they are not yet invented and produced in the foreign coun-
try, and only variety not available in the domestic economy will be imported.
With similar arguments as before, we obtain
kl (i) = [(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ pl=￿l (i)]











16Hence, the monopoly prices of domestic and imported intermediates used by un-
skilled workers are also 1 ￿ ￿. Substituting (36) and (37) into (5) and (6), respec-
tively, we get
Yh = 2(ph)
(1￿￿)=￿ ￿ AhHY and Yl = 2(pl)
(1￿￿)=￿ ￿ AlL: (38)
The combination of (4) and (38) implies (17).
Clearly, in pursuit of pro￿ts, innovation ￿rms in the two economies will special-
ize in the creation of di⁄erent types of intermediates. Hence, in the open world, the
monopoly pro￿ts producing a type of intermediate good used by skilled workers
at time ￿ are
￿h (￿) = 2￿(1 ￿ ￿)[ph (￿)]
1=￿ ￿ HY ; (39)
because of symmetry. Accordingly, the monopoly pro￿ts producing a kind of
intermediate good complementing unskilled workers at time ￿ are
￿l (￿) = 2￿(1 ￿ ￿)[pl (￿)]
1=￿ ￿ L: (40)
Thus, in the equilibrium, (20), (39) and (40) suggest that the prices of skill- and
labor- complementary knowledge are, respectively,
Ph = 2￿(1 ￿ ￿)(ph)
1=￿ ￿ HY =r and Pl = 2￿(1 ￿ ￿)(pl)
1=￿ ￿ L=r: (41)
Since ￿ ows of knowledge are permitted between two countries, research in each
country now depends on the total worldwide stock of knowledge as contained in
the union of Nz and b Nz, z = h;l. Hence, the e⁄ective amount of knowledge that
could be used in research after opening trade will be twice as large as it is before.













Equation (42) says that the double of e⁄ective stock of ideas has the same e⁄ect
as the double of productivity in R&D sectors.






































￿ 2￿H = 0: (44)
By (26) and (43), it is clear that free trade results in an increase in the quantity
of skilled workers used in the production of the skill-intensive good.17 Therefore,
we state the following proposition.
Proposition 4 When ￿ > 1 and 1 ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ 1) < ￿ < 1
1+￿(￿￿1), free trade increases the
degree of skill bias of technology and wage inequality. When ￿ ￿ 1￿￿
2 , it leads to


























= 2, then there












> 2, then it results in a





o is the equilibrium degree of skill bias of
technology in the open economy.18
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, the double of the e⁄ective stock of ideas increases the marginal
product of skilled workers, thus increasing the demand for skilled workers used in
the manufacturing sector. In the meantime, the market size e⁄ect is dominant if
￿ > 1 and ￿ < 1
1+￿(￿￿1). Therefore, trade liberalization leads to an increase in the
degree of skill bias of technology. Since skill-biased technological change favors
skilled workers, wage inequality goes up in the free trade regime.
Acemoglu (2003a) has shown that trade between developed and developing
countries encourages technological change towards skilled workers through increas-
ing the relative price of the skill-intensive good. Thoenig and Verdier (2003) have
illustrated that free trade between developed and developing countries induces
￿rms to adopt defensive innovation strategies, which results in an increase in the
relative demand for skills, hence raising skill premia. Di⁄erently, we show that
trade between developed countries raises the demand for skilled workers used in
the production of the skill-intensive good, therefore inducing skill-biased techno-
logical change through the market size e⁄ect.
17Similar to the Appendix C, this can be proven easily.
18Let us brie￿y discuss di⁄erences between opening up to trade with a symmetric country from doubling the
size of the economy. It is clear that the degree of skill bias of technology remains unchanged when the size of
the economy doubles. Therefore, wage inequality in the case where a country trades with a symmetric country is
larger than that in the case where the size of the country doubles. Moreover, if skill-biased technological change
promotes economic growth, then the growth rate in the former case is higher than that in the latter case. In
contrast, if skill-biased technological change hurts economic growth, then the growth rate in the former case is
lower than that in the latter case.
18Some knowledge-based models (e.g., Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991) argue that
trade with ￿ ows of ideas can permanently increase the rate of growth. However,
they do not consider the direction of technological change. The paper shows, how-
ever, that skill-biased technological change may have a negative e⁄ect on economic
growth. Therefore, trade opening is not always helpful to economic growth in de-
veloping countries, even though it enhances their opportunities to access advanced
technology.
5.2 Trade between Di⁄erent Countries
We now consider the general case of trade between a developed and a developing
country. Suppose that the fraction of skilled workers in the developed country is
higher that in the developing country, namely, HN=LN ￿ HS=LS, where N and S
denote the developed and the developing country, respectively.
Following Acemoglu (2003a), we assume that producers in the developing coun-
try adopt machines invented in the developed country. For convenience, we as-
sume that the productivity of machines in the developing country is the same as
the productivity in the developed country.19 In this circumstance, the demand for
skill-complementary machine and the one for labor-complementary machine are,
respectively,









Hence, the monopoly prices of intermediates are 1 ￿ ￿, the same as before. As a
result, in the open world, the monopoly pro￿ts producing a type of intermediate
good used by skilled workers at time ￿ are20






Similarly, the monopoly pro￿ts producing a kind of intermediate good comple-
menting unskilled workers at time ￿ are





Thus, (20), (46) and (47) suggest that the prices of skill- and labor- complementary
19A more realistic assumption is that the productivity of machines in the developing country is proportional
to that in the developed country. Main results are not altered, however.
20To simplify, we assume that R&D ￿rms in the developed country can capture all revenues generated by
machine sales in the developing country. In the real world, due to poor property rights protection, R&D ￿rms in
the developed country only may capture the proportion of revenues generated by machine sales in the developing
country. However, the main results will be reinforced.
19knowledge are respectively










Obviously, the output of the skill-intensive good and that of the labor-intensive




Y and Y N
l = (pl)




(1￿￿)=￿ ￿ AhHS and Y S
l = (pl)
(1￿￿)=￿ ￿ AlLS: (50)
















Using some tedious algebra, we get
HN























































￿ ￿H = 0: (54)
Using (52) and (53), we state the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Free trade decreases the degree of skill bias of technology.22 For the
developed country, when ￿ >  , trade leads to an increase in the growth rate;
when ￿ =  , the growth rate remains unchanged; whereas when ￿ <  , it leads











2 and   =
21The proof of the existence of solution to (54) is similar to the Appendix A.
22Suppose that the ratio of the productivity of machines complementing z in the developing country to that
in the developed country is v￿
z . Even if vh > vl, the main results are unchanged when vhHS < vlLS. Since







2 . For the developing country, when ￿ > ’, trade leads to an
increase in the growth rate; when ￿ = ’, the growth rate remains invariant; whereas








Proof. See the Appendix.
Due to small market of skill-complementary technology, free trade reduces the
relative pro￿ts of innovation complementing skilled workers. Therefore, trade lib-
eralization is likely to result in skill-replacing technological change. This result is
di⁄erent from that in Acemoglu (2003a) and Theonig and Verdier (2003) where
trade induces skill-biased technological change.
With similar arguments as before, we know that international trade does not
always stimulate economic growth in the developed and the developing country.
Trade between developed countries, however, doubles the e⁄ective stock of ideas
via knowledge ￿ ows. Therefore, open trade between developed may promote the
world economic growth. Since the developing country does not usually create
technology, open trade does not always increase the e⁄ective stock of ideas. As a
result, open trade between the developed and developing country may decline the
world growth rate.






















Therefore, we state the following proposition
Proposition 6 When ￿ > 1 and 1￿￿(￿ ￿ 1) < ￿ < 1
1+￿(￿￿1), trade leads to an increases
in wage inequality in the developing country, whereas it decreases wage inequality
in the developed country.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Since the degree of skill bias of technology in the opening developing country
is larger than that in the developing country in the close economy, trade increases
wage inequality in the developing country. In the developed country, however,
owing to skill-replacing technological change, wage inequality declines.
6 Conclusion
We have built a knowledge-based model to explore how directed technological
change impacts scale e⁄ect and skill premia, and how trade in consumer and
intermediate goods in￿ uences wage inequality and economic growth. The key
assumption is that R&D sectors use skilled workers.
21On the one hand, the average productivity of skill-complementary knowledge in
the R&D sector, which produces knowledge complementing skills, decreases with
the degree of skill bias of technology. This implies that skill-biased technological
change results in a decrease in the growth rate. On the other hand, the average
productivity of labor-complementary knowledge in the R&D sector, which gen-
erates labor-complementary knowledge, increases with the degree of skill bias of
technology. This suggests that skill-biased technological change leads to an in-
crease in the growth rate. Therefore, scale e⁄ect may be absent. In this paper, the
two facts, accelerated skilled-biased technological change and the absence of scale
e⁄ect, have been jointly accounted for in a uni￿ed framework. As far as we know,
we are the ￿rst to connect skill-biased technological change and scale e⁄ect.
Free trade between developed countries increases the demand for skilled work-
ers used in the production of the skill-intensive good, thus inducing skill-biased
technological change via the market size e⁄ect. As a result, increased international
trade between developed countries could be a major cause of the increase in wage
inequality. On the contrary, because of small market of skill-complementary inno-
vations in developing countries, trade between developed and developing countries
may decrease their relative pro￿ts. Therefore, free trade encourages skill-replacing
technological change and declines wage inequality in the developed country. How-
ever, the degree of skill bias of technology in the developing country in the open
regime is greater than the one before opening, therefore trade leads to an increase
in skill premia in the developing country.
Since the degree of skill bias of technology has opposite e⁄ects on economic
growth, free trade promotes economic growth under some circumstances and hin-
ders economic growth under other circumstances. This implies that trade opening
does not always promote economic growth in developing countries, even though it
increases their opportunities to access advanced technology.
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25Appendix A: Existence of the Solutions
Equation (28) implies that f (+1) = +1, f (0) = ￿1 as ￿ > 1￿￿
2 , and f (+1) = ￿1,
f (0) = +1 as ￿ < 1￿￿
2 . In the meantime, f (￿) is continuous. Therefore, there exists
at least one solution to (28) when ￿ 6= 1￿￿
2 . In addition, when ￿ = 1￿￿
2 , (28) can be
rewritten as (Ah=Al)
2￿ [(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)L ￿ ￿]￿￿H (Ah=Al)
￿ +(1 ￿ ￿)L￿￿ = 0. Hence, when
(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)L ￿ ￿ 6= 0 and ￿
2H2 ￿ 4[(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)L ￿ ￿] ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)L ￿ ￿] ￿ 0, there exists at
least one solution to (28).
Appendix B: The Number of the Solutions to (28)











￿ 2￿ ￿ ￿H = 0:





















= (￿L + a)xm + axm￿2 ￿ ￿x ￿ ￿x￿1 ￿ ￿H = 0; (A1)
where 0 ￿ x < +1, a = (1 ￿ ￿)L and m = 2￿
1￿￿. Simple calculus gives
F1(x) , x2F0 (x) = m(￿L + ￿)xm+1 + (m ￿ 2)axm￿1 ￿ ￿x2 + ￿;
F2(x) , F0
1(x) = m(m + 1)(￿L + ￿)xm + (m ￿ 2)(m ￿ 1)axm￿2 ￿ 2￿x;
F3(x) , F0
2 (x) = m2(m + 1)(￿L + a)xm￿1 + (m ￿ 2)2(m ￿ 1)axm￿3 ￿ 2￿;
and
F4(x) , F0
3 (x) = (m ￿ 1)m2(m + 1)(￿L + a)xm￿2 + (m ￿ 3)(m ￿ 2)2(m ￿ 1)axm￿4:
These formulas clarify completely the properties of solutions to (A1). Firstly, for
m = 1,
F(x) = (￿L + a ￿ ￿)x + (a ￿ ￿)x￿1 ￿ ￿H:






￿(A1) has two solutions when the minimum is negative;
￿(A1) has only one solution when the minimum is zero;
26￿(A1) has no solution when the minimum is positive.






￿(A1) has two solutions when the maximum is positive;
￿(A1) has only one solution when the maximum is zero;
￿(A1) has no solution when the maximum is negative.
￿ If ￿L + a > ￿ > a, F(0) = ￿1, F(+1) = +1 and F0(x) > 0. Hence (A1) is
uniquely solved.
￿ If ￿L + a = ￿ > a, there is no solution.
￿ If ￿L + a > ￿ = a, the unique solution is x = H
L.
Since F(0) = ￿1 and F(+1) = +1 if m > 1, and F(0) = +1 and F(+1) = ￿1 if
m < 1, there exists at least one solution to (A1) for m 6= 1. By analyzing functions
F1, F2, F3 and F4, we can show clearly the number of the solutions. For instance,
we provide some qualitative conclusions as follows.
￿ m ￿ 3: F4(x) > 0, and therefore F3(x) strictly increases. Since F3(0) = ￿2￿ and
F3(+1) = +1, F3(x) = 0 is uniquely solved. Moreover, F2(x) decreases before
increasing. Now that F2(0) = 0 implies that F2(x) = 0 has two solutions (one is
zero and the other is supposed as x1 > 0). Consequently, F1(x) is also decreases
before increasing, and F1(0) = ￿ and F1(+1) = +1 imply that
￿(A1) has only one solution, if F1(x1) ￿ 0, which means that F(x) is strictly
increasing;
￿The number of solutions to (A1) may be 1, 2, or 3, if F1(x1) < 0, which
means that F(x) is a strictly increasing-decreasing-increasing function.
￿ 2 < m < 3: F4(x) is strictly increasing and has only one zero point (supposed to
be x2 > 0). Thus F3(x) is strictly decreasing-increasing, and from F3(0) = +1
and F3(+1) = +1, we get that the solutions of F3(x) = 0 depend on its mini-
mum, i.e. F3(x2). Generally, F3(x) may have 0, 1 or 2 zero points. Therefore,
F2(x) maybe strictly increasing, or increasing-decreasing-increasing. Now that
F2(0) = 0 and F2(+1) = +1 imply that F2(x) = 0 may have 1 (precisely x = 0), 2
(one is zero and the other is positive), or 3 (the last supposed to be x3 > 0) so-
lutions. The former two cases suggest that F1(x) is strictly increasing, and the
latter suggests that F1(x) is increasing-decreasing-increasing. Hence F1(0) = ￿
and F1(+1) = +1 imply that
27￿(A1) has only one solution, if F1(x3) ￿ 0, which means that F(x) is strictly
increasing;
￿The number of solutions to (A1) may be 1, 2, or 3, if F1(x3) < 0, which
means that F(x) is an increasing-decreasing-increasing function.
￿ m = 2: F4(x) > 0, and therefore F3(x) strictly increases. Since F3(0) = ￿2￿
and F3(+1) = +1, F3(x) = 0 is uniquely solved, and then F2(x) is strictly
decreasing-increasing. Now that F2(0) = 0 implies that F2(x) = 0 has two
solutions (one is zero and the other is supposed as x4 > 0). As a result, F1(x)
is also strictly decreasing-increasing, and F1(0) = ￿ and F1(+1) = +1 imply
that
￿(A1) has only one solution, if F1(x4) ￿ 0, which means that F(x) is strictly
increasing;
￿The number of solutions to (A1) may be 1, 2, or 3, if F1(x4) < 0, which
means that F(x) is a strictly increasing-decreasing-increasing function.
￿ 1 < m < 2: F4(x) = 0 is uniquely solved at x5 > 0, F4(x) < 0 for x < x5 and F4(x) >
0 for x > x5. In fact, F4(x) increases from ￿1 to its positive maximum and then
decreases to 0. Now F3(x) is strictly decreasing-increasing from F3(0) = +1 to
F3(+1) = +1. Thus the solutions of F3(x) = 0 depend on its minimum, i.e.
F3(x5). Generally, F3(x) may have 0, 1 or 2 zero points. Therefore, F2(x) maybe
strictly increasing, or increasing-decreasing-increasing. Since F2(0) = ￿1 and
F2(+1) = +1, we have F2(x) = 0 may have 1, 2, or 3 positive solutions. The
former two cases assure that F1(x) is strictly decreasing-increasing, and the
latter assure that F1(x) is strictly decreasing-increasing-decreasing-increasing.
Therefore F1(0) = ￿ and F1(+1) = +1 imply that
￿(A1) has only one solution, if the minimum of F1(x) is nonnegative;
￿The number of solutions to (A1) may be 1, 2, or 3, if the negative mini-
mum of F1(x) is reached at only one minimal point;
￿The number of solutions to (A1) may be 1, 2, or 3, if the local maximum
of F1(x) is non-positive;
￿The number of solutions to (A1) may be 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5, if the negative
local minimums of F1(x) is reached at two minimal points and the local
maximum is positive.
￿ m < 1: F4(x) = 0 is uniquely solved at x6 > 0, F4(x) > 0 for x < x6 and F4(x) < 0
for x > x6. In fact, F4(x) decrease from +1 to its negative minimum and then
increases to 0. Now F3(x) is strictly increasing-decreasing from F3(0) = ￿1 to
28F3(+1) = ￿2￿. Thus the solutions of F3(x) = 0 depend on its maximum, i.e.
F3(x6). Generally, F3(x) may have 0, 1 or 2 zero points. Therefore, F2(x) may
be strictly decreasing, or decreasing-increasing-decreasing. Since F2(0) = +1
and F2(+1) = ￿1, we have F2(x) = 0 may have 1, 2, or 3 positive solu-
tions. The former two cases assure that F1(x) is strictly increasing-decreasing,
and the latter assure that F1(x) is increasing-decreasing-increasing-decreasing.
Therefore, F1(0) = ￿1 and F1(+1) = ￿1 imply that
￿(A1) has only one solution, if the maximum of F1(x) is non-positive;
￿The number of solutions to (A1) may be 1, 2, or 3, if the positive maxi-
mum of F1(x) is reached at only one maximal point;
￿The number of solutions to (A1) may be 1, 2, or 3, if the local minimum
of F1(x) is nonnegative;
￿The number of solutions to (A1) may be 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5, if the positive













































































@H 6= 0. Equations (27) and (29) imply that when ￿ ￿ ￿
2, @HY
@H > 0.
Otherwise, consumers would like to raise both HY and g to increase utility as H
enlarges. They also imply that when ￿ < ￿
2, if @HY
@H < 0, then
@g
@H > 0. Clearly, all
other things being equal, a decrease in HY reduces the aggregate output, therefore
declining social welfare. Consequently, when H increases, a decrease in HY and an
increase in g is not optimal for consumers who prefer smoothing consumption. As
a result, HY goes up such that @HY
@H > 0 and
@g
@H < 0 hold.
It is clear that when H, L increase and H=L remains invariant, HY =L remains
unchanged in the equilibrium. Therefore, when H, L and H=L increase, HY =L raises
29in the equilibrium. Similar arguments yields that when H, L decreases but H=L
raises, HY =L also enlarges in the equilibrium. Therefore,
@(HY =L)
@(H=L) > 0.
Appendix D: Proof of Propositions














Obviously, when ￿ > 1 and ￿ < 1
1+￿(￿￿1), ￿ > 0. Hence,
@(Ah=Al)
@(H=L) > 0, that is, techno-
logical change is skill-biased.
Proof of Proposition 2: It is obvious from proposition 1 and (29).
Proof of Proposition 3: It is clear from proposition 1 and (34).
Proof of Proposition 4: Free trade leads to an increase in the quantity of skilled
workers used in the production of the skill-intensive good, hence when ￿ > 1 and
￿ < 1
1+￿(￿￿1) hold, open trade increases the degree of skill bias of technology and
wage inequality.














Therefore, when ￿ > 1￿￿
2 and ￿ = 1￿￿







































> 2, the growth rate
decreases.
Proof of Proposition 5: Combination of (52), (53) and Appendix C implies that











. That is, free trade may encourage



















Therefore, for the developed country, when ￿ >  , trade increases the growth rate;
when ￿ =  , the growth rate remains invariant; whereas when ￿ <  , it decreases
the growth rate. For the developing country, when ￿ > ’, trade leads to an increase
30in the growth rate; when ￿ = ’, the growth rate remains invariant; whereas when
￿ < ’, it leads to a decreases in the growth rate.
Proof of Proposition 6: Obviously, before trade liberalization, skill premia in























Since ￿ > 1 and 1 ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ 1) < ￿ < 1











o, therefore wage inequality declines in the developed country.
In the meantime, becuase of HN=LN ￿ HS=LS, (52), (53) and Appendix C together










o. It follows that wage
inequality increases in the developing country.
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